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Summary 
Many states offer tax incentives to companies that invest or expand business 
operations in the state. In a 2004 decision, Cuno v. DairnlerChrysler, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the constitutionality oftwo such incentives. The 
court held that Ohio's investment tax credit violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, but that its property tax abatement scheme did not. Approximately 40 
states have credits similar to the one struck down in Cuno. The Economic Development 
Act of 2005 (H.R. 2471 and S. 1066, 109th Congress) has been introduced to give states 
the authority to offer tax incentives like Ohio's investment tax credit. 
Like most states, Ohio provides various tax incentives to encourage businesses to 
locate or expand operations in the state. Two of its incentives, the investment tax credit 
and property tax abatement scheme, were the subject of a recent court case, Cuno v. 
~airnlerChrysler.' Ohio's investment tax credit is a non-refbndable credit against the 
state's corporate franchise tax. The credit may be claimed by a taxpayer who purchases 
new manufacturing machinery and equipment that is installed in Ohio.2 It is calculated 
using a formula that factors in the amount that the new property's costs exceed the 
average amount spent on new property in the county where the property is installed. Any 
unused credit may be carried forward for three years. Under Ohio's property tax 
abatement scheme, Ohio municipalities may offer an abatement to a business that agrees 
to "establish, expand, renovate, or occupy a facility and hire new employees, or preserve 
employment opportunities for existing employees" in economically depressed areas.3 The 
exemption may be granted for up to ten years and for up to 75% of the property's assessed 
value. The 75% limit may be raised if the affected school districts agree. 
In 1998, DaimlerChrysler and the City of Toledo entered into an agreement under 
which the company would construct a new vehicle-assembly plant in exchange for a 
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ten-year property tax exemption. Additionally, the company's investments would qualify 
for Ohio's investment tax credit. The tax incentives were valued at $280 million. 
In 1998, taxpayers from Ohio and Michigan brought suit against DaimlerChrysler, 
the State of Ohio, the City of Toledo and several other defendants, alleging, among other 
things, that the tax incentives violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution." 
As discussed below, the U.S. district court held that both incentives were constitutional, 
while the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the investment tax credit 
violated the Commerce Clause but the property tax abatement did not. 
Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. 
Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce has been described as plenary and 
limited only by other constitutional  provision^.^ On the flip side of the issue, the Supreme 
Court has long held that the states may not unduly burden interstate commerce in the 
absence of federal regulation. This restriction is founded in what is referred to as the 
dormant Commerce Clause. A state tax provision does not violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause if four qualifications are met: ( I )  the activity taxed has a substantial 
nexus with the taxing State; (2) the tax is fairly apportioned to reflect the degree of 
activity that occurs within the State; (3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate 
commerce; and (4) the tax is fairly related to benefits provided by the state.6 
In the Cuno case, the only issue with respect to the Commerce Clause was whether 
the tax incentives were discriminatory. There is no simple definition of the term 
"discriminatory." Instead, the Supreme Court has provided general principles, which then 
must be applied to the specific tax at issue. For example, the Court has declared that a 
"fundamental principle" of the Commerce Clause is that states may not "impose a tax 
which discriminates against interstate commerce . . . by providing a direct commercial 
advantage to local b~s iness . "~  Another general rule is that a state may use its tax system 
to encourage intrastate commerce and may compete with other states for interstate 
commerce so long as the state does not "discriminatorily tax the products manufactured 
or the business operations performed in any other [~ l t a te . "~  
In tax cases where the plaintiff is a party other than the taxpayer who is contesting the tax due, 
an important issue is whether the plaintiff has standing to bring the suit. In this case, it appears 
the defendants conceded that one plaintiff business had standing since it risked losing property 
through a governmental taking due to Toledo's agreement with DaimlerChrysler. The State of 
Ohio's Petition for Rehearing at 9, Cuno, 386 F.3d 738. Due to changes in that plaintiffs 
circumstances (it lost the eminent domain case and vacated its property), Ohio argued in its 
petition to the Sixth Circuit for en banc review that the case should be dismissed because no 
taxpayer had standing. Id. at 9-10. The court denied the motion to review the case en banc. 
Cuno, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1750 (6th Cir. 2005). 
See e.g., Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408,434 (1946). 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274,279 (1977). 
' Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 3 18, 329 (1 977). 
Id. at 336-37 
The Supreme Court and other federal courts have not addressed whether an 
investment tax credit similar to the one at issue in Cuno is discriminatory. Thus, the 
district court and court of appeals were left to look at the general principles found in the 
Court's decisions and analogize the Ohio tax incentives to those in the prior cases. As 
shown by the opposite outcomes of the two courts with respect to the investment tax 
credit (discussed below), it is possible to come to different conclusions on the meaning 
of the Supreme Court's prior cases. The decisions in Cuno broadly represent two 
viewpoints ofthe court's jurispr~dence.~ The district court's decision represents the idea 
that the purpose of the Commerce Clause is to prevent economic protectionism by the 
states; i.e., prevent states from helping in-state businesses by penalizing out-of-state 
businesses. The decision by the court of appeals represents the view that the Clause's 
purpose is to encourage free trade by limiting the state's ability to use its taxing power to 
coerce taxpayers into conducting business in that state. As seen in the two opinions, there 
is support in the Supreme Court's prior decisions for both interpretations; however, absent 
activity by the Supreme Court, the opinion by the court of appeals is controlling. 
Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler 
District Court. The U.S. district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss 
the case for failure to state a claim. Among other things, the court found that neither the 
investment tax credit nor the property tax exemption violated the Commerce Clause. The 
court began by noting that the Supreme Court has explained that a state may use its taxing 
system to compete with other states for a share of interstate commerce so long as the state 
does not discriminatorily tax business operations conducted in the other states. 
The court then described what it believed were the two types of state taxation 
schemes that the Supreme Court had found to be discriminatory. First, states could not 
tax goods imported from other states without imposing a tax on in-state goods. The court 
found this was not an issue with the Ohio incentives. Second, a state's tax could not be 
based on what proportion of a business' activities were carried on in the state as compared 
to business in other states. The court described the tax scheme in Westinghouse Electric 
Co. v. ~ ~ 1 1 ~ ' '  as the "paradigmatic example" of what was not allowed." In that case, New 
York's corporate franchise tax combined the income from a subsidiary engaged in exports 
with the income of its parent company, with the tax assessed against the parent. To 
encourage in-state business activity, New York offered a credit that lowered the effective 
tax rate on the combined income as the subsidiary's exports from New York increased 
relative to those from other states. The court noted that the New York credit was similar 
to the Ohio incentives because an increase in New York activity would increase the New 
York credit amount and an increase in Ohio activity would increase the Ohio incentive 
amounts. However, the court made what it considered to be an important distinction 
For further discussion, see Peter D. Enrich [plaintiffs' attorney in Ctino], "Saving the States 
From Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business," 110 
Haw. L. Rev. 377 (1996); Clayton P. Gillette, "Business Incentives, Interstate Competition, and 
the Commerce Clause," 82 Minn. L. Rev. 447 (1997); testimony from the hearing on the Cuno 
case held by two subcommittees of the House Judiciary Committee (May 24, 2005), which is 
available at [http://judiciary.house.gov/Oversight.aspx?ID=164]. 
l o  466 U.S. 388 (1984). 
" Cuno, 154 F.Supp.2d at 1203. 
between the two cases: while an increase in activity conducted outside New York would 
decrease the amount of the New York credit, an increase in activity conducted outside 
Ohio would not decrease the benefits of the Ohio tax incentives. As a result, the court did 
not find the Ohio incentives to be discriminatory. 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The plaintiffs appealed the district court's 
decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the investment tax 
credit violated the Commerce Clause, and reversed this part of the lower court's decision. 
The appeals court upheld the district court's holding with respect to the property tax 
exemption. 
Investment Tax Credit. The court found that the investment tax credit was 
discriminatory because it coerced businesses that are subject to the Ohio franchise tax to 
expand in Ohio rather than in another state. First, the court rejected the defendants' 
argument, which was accepted by the district court, that prior Supreme Court opinions 
had held that only two types of taxes were unacceptable: those that hnctioned as tariffs 
and those that determined the taxpayer's effective tax rate using both in-state and out-of- 
state activities. The court characterized this view as being "primarily concerned with 
preventing economic protectionism," and the court rejected this approach because it "rests 
on the distinction between laws that benefit in-state activity and laws that burden 
out-of-state acti~ity." '~ The court described this distinction as "tenuous" since the 
Supreme Court had stated that "virtually every discriminatory statute . . . can be viewed 
as conferring a benefit on one party and a detriment on the other, in either an absolute or 
relative sense."13 
Instead, the appeals court compared the Ohio tax incentives to state tax schemes that 
the Supreme Court had found to be discriminatory because the "schemes were the state 
using its power to tax an in-state operation as a way to encourage further investment in 
the state at the expense of development in other states."I4 The court looked at three cases: 
0 Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 429 U.S. 3 18 (1977), 
where the Court invalidated part of a New York securities transfer tax. 
New York imposed a tax on a transfer of securities if a taxable event 
occurred in the state. Since New York was the only state that taxed 
securities transfers, the tax placed New York brokers at a disadvantage. 
The state created incentives to encourage New York sales: if a sale 
occurred in New York, then nonresidents were taxed at a lower rate and 
both residents and nonresidents could not be taxed above a certain 
amount. The court of appeals quoted the Supreme Court as finding that 
the incentives "foreclosed tax-neutral decisions" and that New York was 
improperly using "its power to tax an in-state operation as a means of 
requiring [other] business operations to be performed in the home state," 
'' Cuno, 386 F.3d at 745 
l 3  Id. 
l 4  ~ d .  
which was "wholly inconsistent with the free trade purpose of the 
Commerce Cla~se." '~  
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981), where the Supreme Court 
invalidated a Louisiana severance tax credit that favored in-state natural 
gas producers. The appeals court quoted the Supreme Court as finding 
that since the credit "favored those who both own [offshore] gas and 
engage in Louisiana production" and that the "obvious economic effect 
of this Severance Tax Credit [was] to encourage natural gas owners 
involved in the production of [offshore] gas to invest in mineral 
exploration and development within Louisiana rather than to invest in 
further [offshore] development or in production in other States," the 
credit "unquestionably discriminated against interstate commerce in favor 
of local interests."I6 
0 Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, which was discussed above in the 
section on the district court's opinion and was distinguished by that 
court. The court of appeals quoted the Supreme Court as stating that the 
tax scheme "penalized increases in the [export] shipping activities in 
other states," which meant it placed "a discriminatory burden on 
commerce to its sister States."I7 
The court of appeals found the Ohio credit to be analogous to these other tax 
incentives in that it coerced taxpayers into making in-state investments. This was because 
the credit reduced the business' pre-existing franchise tax liability. That is, a business 
with activities in Ohio would be subject to the state's franchise tax regardless of whether 
the business made an investment in new property eligible for the tax credit. That business 
could, however, reduce its existing franchise tax liability by making new investments that 
qualify for the tax credit. On the other hand, if the business chose to make the new 
investments outside of Ohio, it would not reduce its Ohio franchise tax liability. This 
meant, in the court's view, that Ohio was using its power to tax in a way that discouraged 
investment outside of Ohio. As aresult, it held the credit was discriminatory and enjoined 
Ohio from administering the credit (however, this order has been stayed; see the 
"Supreme Court" section, below). 
Property tax exemption. Like the district court, the court of appeals held that 
the property tax exemption did not violate the Commerce Clause. The appeals court 
found that the conditions for exemption were permissible because they directly related to 
the use of the exempted property. Furthermore, unlike the tax credit, the exemption was 
not coercive because it did not reduce taxes that the company would owe regardless of 
whether the company made the new investments in Ohio. Instead, the exemption only 
allowed the taxpayer to escape taxation on the new investment. In other words, the 
incentive was not coercive because a taxpayer who did not make any new Ohio 
l 5  Id. at 734. 
l 6  Id. 
" Id. at 735. 
investments was not subject to the property tax that the incentive abated. Additionally, 
a taxpayer would not lose the exemption if it made other investments outside of the state. 
Supreme Court. The defendants intend to appeal the case to the U.S. Supreme 
court.18 Ohio has successfully petitioned the court of appeals to stay the district court's 
decision until the Supreme Court decides whether to hear the case. Thus, taxpayers may 
continue to claim the Ohio tax credit for the time being. If the Supreme Court decides not 
to hear the defendants' appeal, then the appeals court's decision stands and is applicable 
to all the states in the Sixth Circuit.19 These are Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, and 
Kentucky. It appears that the other three states offer investment tax credits similar to the 
one invalidated in Cuno. 
Legislation introduced in the logth Congress. The Economic Development 
Act of 2005, H.R. 2471 and S. 1066, has been introduced to give states the authority to 
offer incentives like the one struck down in Cuno. The act would generally allow the 
states to provide discriminatory tax incentives if they are for economic development 
purposes. An economic development purpose would include any legally permitted 
activity for attracting, retaining or expanding business activity, jobs, or investment in a 
state. Some incentives would not be allowed, including those that depend on state of 
incorporation or domicile; require the recipient to acquire or use services or property 
produced in the state; are reduced as a direct result of an increase in out-of-state activity; 
result in a loss of a compensating tax system; require reciprocal tax benefits from another 
jurisdiction; or reduce a tax not imposed on apportioned interstate activities. The act 
would apply to all qualifying tax incentives, regardless of their date of enactment. 
Legislation introduced in the 108th Congress. S. 2881 would have allowed 
the states to offer tax incentives for investment in new machinery or equipment in the 
state. The legislation would have explicitly stated that the state's action would not be an 
undue burden on interstate commerce. H.R. 5427 would have allowed the states to offer 
tax incentives for investment in the acquisition, construction, installation, and 
rehabilitation of improvements, real estate, fixtures, equipment, and facilities located in 
the state. Like S. 288 1, the legislation would have explicitly stated that the state's actions 
did not unduly burden interstate commerce. 
l 9  It appears that similar cases have been brought in at least three other states: Nebraska [Decamp 
v. Nebraska, No. C104 198 1 (Neb. 3d Dist. Ct.)], Minnesota [Olson v. Minnesota, Ramsey County 
District Court, Second Judicial District, Case No. 62-C8-05-27271, and North Carolina [Blinson 
v. North Carolina, complaint available at [http://www.ncicl.org/LITIGATION/complaint.htm1]]. 
